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The use of international policy coordination to limit exchange rate fluctuations 
assumes  that  there  are  generally  agreed  upon  measures  of  disequilibruim. 
Frequently  mentioned in this  context  are current  accounts and  international 
indebtedness.  The focus  of  this  paper  is  the  adequacy  of  data  on  current 
accounts and international investment positions as measures of the need for 
policy adjustments and coordination. Since I am most familiar with U.S. data, 
much of  the discussion will focus on the U.S. current account and position. 
There are several reasons for questioning the adequacy of  current account 
and position data for use as measures of disequilibruim requiring international 
policy  adjustments and coordination.  High on this  list has been  the growth 
during  the  past  decade  in  two  discrepancies:  the  global  current  account 
discrepancy and the statistical discrepancy in the U. S. international transac- 
tions accounts. 
9.1  Global Current Account Discrepancy 
If data collection were completely accurate,  each export recorded by one 
country would be matched by an equal import recorded by another country; 
the sum of all trade and services transactions for the whole world would equal 
zero. In practice, they do  not sum to zero; reported imports of goods and services 
exceed reported exports. Moreover, as shown in table 9.1, this discrepancy has 
been very large in the 1980s and, although down substantially from the peak 
of $106 billion reached in 1982, it shows little sign of disappearing. The largest 
problems appear to be in the services accounts. When account is taken of the 
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Note; In billions of  dollars. 
Source: IMF (1988,  143). 
”Including official transfers 
bCovers estimated balances on current transactions only in convertible  currencies of the U.S.S.R. and nonmember countries of Eastcm Europe 
‘Reflects  errors, omissions,  and asymmetries in reported balance of  payments statistics on current account, plus balances with countries not included. 
dStaff estimates of the difference between the beginning-of-year and end-of-year “float,”  that is, the value of  those exports that have not yet been recorded as imports 
(usually because the goods are in transit or because of delays in the processing of the documentation). The estimates should be viewed as only rough orders of  magnitude. 
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fact that shipping goods takes time and that exports at the end of one year may 
be recorded as imports in the next year, the residual asymmetry in the trade 
balance is positive and relatively small. The large negative discrepancy appears 
to be mainly the result of  services transactions. 
In response to the growing global discrepancy, the IMF set up a working 
party to investigate the reasons for its growth and to assess its implications for 
the  usefulness  of  countries’  current  account  positions  as  indicators  of  the 
need for policy  adjustments.  The working party concentrated  on five areas: 
direct  investment  income, portfolio investment  income,  offshore  financial 
centers and financial innovations, shipping and transportation, and unrequited 
transfers. 
The working party concluded that the most important source of the global 
discrepancy was portfolio investment income and that the overriding factor was 
the emergence of  a large body of cross-border assets recognized by the debtor 
countries but not by the creditors, coupled with a higher level of interest rates 
after 1979 (IMF 1987, 12). Working party members reached this conclusion 
by comparing reported credits and debits with estimates based upon independent 
information on outstanding  stocks of  cross-border  assets  and  liabilities and 
estimates of appropriate yields. In particular, heavy reliance was placed on the 
banking data reported to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
The resulting adjustments to portfolio investment income were widespread; 
the working party added net credits to the current accounts of most world areas. 
Table 9.2 reproduces the working party’s allocation of the services and transfer 
discrepancy, by country groups, for  1983. For a more detailed analysis, the 
interested reader is referred to the report of the working party (IMF 1987). In 
conclusion,  the  working  party  judged  that  the  additions  to  countries’  net 
current account receipts  were  not so concentrated  in  any single country or 
group of  countries as to invalidate the basic thrust of analyses drawn from the 
uncorrected figures. 
9.2  U.S. Statistical Discrepancy 
In contrast  to the  global  discrepancy  investigated  by  the  IMF,  the  U.S. 
statistical discrepancy need not reflect errors and omissions in the reporting of 
current account transactions.  In principle,  the  sum of all transactions in the 
U.S.  balance  of  payments  accounts, a  double-entry  bookkeeping  system, 
should equal zero; for each transaction there should be two equal entries of 
opposite sign. In practice, the recorded accounts never sum exactly to zero 
because the data that would reflect the debit and credit counterparts  of each 
single transaction generally  are obtained from different sources. A positive 
statistical discrepancy represents some combination of net unrecorded exports 
of  goods and services to foreigners and net unreported  capital inflows from 
abroad. Table 9.2  Allocation of Services and Transfer Discrepancy, 1983 
Income on Investments 
Country Group 
Other direct 
Reinvested  investment 
earnings  income 
Industrial countries 
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Note: In  billions of  dollars 
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The growth of the statistical discrepancy  in the U.S. international transac- 
tions accounts is a relatively  recent development. In both the  1950s and the 
1960s the statistical discrepancy was close to zero (see fig. 9.1). In contrast, 
during the  early  1970s  there  were  substantial  net  unrecorded  outflows  or 
payments. Since 1974 a positive  statistical discrepancy  indicating net unre- 
corded receipts or  inflows has developed. This increase in magnitude is not just 
the result of the inflation of nominal values. Consider, for example, the ratio 
of  the statistical  discrepancy  to the value of  trade  (the average of  recorded 
exports and imports of  goods and services). The mean absolute value of  this 
ratio was 0.02 in the 1950s and the 1960s, but 0.05 in the 1970s and 0.06 in 
the 1980s. The peak values for this ratio in the postwar period were 0.14 in 
1971 and 0.10 in 1982. 
9.2.1  Possible Explanations 
Early Focus on Capital Flows 
In the early 1980s, it was assumed that the sudden increase in the positive 
discrepancy was largely accounted for by unrecorded capital flows. The wide 
quarterly swings in the size of the statistical discrepancy  also supported that 
conclusion.  It  was  recognized  that  errors  and  omissions occurred  in  the 
Blllions of Dollars 
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Fig. 9.1  Statistical discrepancy in U.S. international transactions accounts 
Source: Survey of  Current Business. 352  Lois Stekler 
reporting of  trade transactions,  but there seemed little reason to assume that 
these errors would  suddenly  increase or that they  would  vary  widely  from 
quarter to quarter. 
Previous  pcriods  of  relatively  large  positive  statistical  discrepancies  had 
coincided with unsettled political and economic conditions abroad. The ratio 
of the value of the statistical discrepancy to trade was about as high as or higher 
than the 1979-80  levels (0.08) in certain Depression years (1934, 1935, and 
1937), in the early years of World War I1 (1939-41),  and in 1948. It seemed 
reasonable to assume that these earlier episodes were associated with the flight 
of  capital to a safe haven  in the United  States in forms that were not  fully 
reported,  either  because  these  investors  wanted  to  remain  anonymous  or 
because the reporting  system failed to catch many small investors. The only 
other year since World War I1 when the statistical discrepancy was relatively 
large,  although  negative,  was  1971.  It  seemed  plausible  to  assume  that 
expectations of dollar depreciation plus certain capital export restraints had led 
to unrecorded capital outflows in that year. The revolution in Iran in 1978 and 
the second oil crisis, combined with the rapid accumulation of wealth in OPEC 
hands  and  the  U.S. freeze  of  Iranian  assets, were  all  considered  potential 
contributing factors to the unrecorded inflows in  1979 and  1980. 
Evidence of  Unreported Capital Flows 
In general, it is not possible to check the data on U.S. capital flows used in 
the international transactions accounts against data on the same transactions 
from other  sources. Most countries  do not  collect  detailed  information  on 
capital flows, by country. Moreover, even where they do, there is little basis 
for deciding which data are correct. In addition, analysis is complicated by the 
central  role of  financial centers  like London, which  do not collect data on 
transactions by foreigners in foreign securities. For example, in the U.S. data, 
new issues of Eurobonds by  U.S. corporations show up as sales of securities 
to underwriters in the United Kingdom, but the U.K. data would not include 
these transactions. 
Data comparisons are possible with the few countries that collect detailed 
data on capital flows broken down by  country and for ccrtain bank transac- 
tions.  In  both  cases,  these  data  comparisons  suggest  that  there  may  be 
substantial errors and omissions in the data on U.S. international capital flows 
included in the U. S. international transactions accounts. 
Much has been  made in the press in recent  years about apparent discrep- 
ancies  between  U.S.  and  Japanese  data  on  Japanese  purchases  of  U.S. 
Treasury securities. Unfortunately, precise comparisons are not possible on the 
basis  of  published  data  because  these  data  are  aggregated  in  somewhat 
different ways.' The U.S. data indicate that residents of Japan (both official 
and private) purchased net virtually  no U.S. Treasury  securities in  1986 or 
1987 and that, with purchases of other bonds and stocks, Japanese investments 
in  U.S.  securities amounted  to approximately  $13 billion  in  1986 and  $14 353  International Transactions & Position Data in Policy Coordination 
billion  in  1987. Japanese  data  indicate  private  Japanese  residents  alone 
purchased net $49 billion in U.S. securities in 1986 and $37 billion in 1987. 
Anecdotal  evidence would  seem to support the Japanese data, but  this im- 
pression is largely based upon the participation of the U.S. offices of Japanese- 
owned securities firms in the U.S. Treasury auctions. These offices did not 
report significant net sales of  Treasury securities to Japan in these years. 
It is likely that the discrepancy between U.S. and Japanese data on securities 
purchases  reflects  inadequacies  in both  reporting systems. Confusion  about 
reporting responsibility  is likely to occur in the U.S. system when the U.S. 
offices of  Japanese firms place orders for securities for their head offices. The 
seller of  the securities may not know that the purchaser is the foreign office, 
while the U.S. office of  the Japanese firm may not report the sale because, 
technically,  they  never  owned  the  securities.  However,  confusion  is  also 
possible in the Japanese reports of transactions by country. Transactions may 
be reported  according to the nationality of the debtor,  where the security is 
listed,  or according  to the residence  of  the transactor.  Only if  the data  are 
reported  on the  last  basis  would  it  be  consistent with  the U.S. data  and, 
therefore, a check on U.S. data accuracy. In the U.S. data, Japanese purchases 
of U.  S . Treasury securities in the London market or purchases of Eurobonds 
issued by U.S. corporations would not be recorded  as sales to Japan. 
In  addition  to  comparisons of  U.S.  data  with  data  collected  by  other 
countries for balance of payments purposes, it is also possible to compare U.S. 
data with  data collected  by  bank  regulatory  authorities.  The BIS  receives 
reports from a large number of  countries on banks’ claims on and liabilities 
to bank and nonbank residents of many countries. (These data on cross-border 
bank transactions are also published in modified form by the IMF .) In theory, 
the  claims of  banks in  a foreign country  on U.S. banks should  match  the 
liabilities of  U.S. banks to banks  in that  country. In practice,  precise com- 
parisons are difficult because of differences in definitions. Many foreign coun- 
tries include in their reports holdings  by banks of securities issued by U.S. 
banks; U .S. banks exclude securities from their reported liabilities. (Changing 
the U.S. reports to include these would be difficult because the banks have little 
information on who holds their securities.) U.S. banks include in their reports 
custody holdings of  negotiable instruments such as bankers’ acceptances and 
commercial paper, which need not be the liabilities of banks in the United States. 
In addition, they report as custody liabilities, loans to U.S. nonbanks that are 
booked at their offices outside the United States. In foreign reports, these would 
be included in claims on U.S. nonbanks. The BIS and the IMF are currently 
working on comparisons  of countries’  data and attempting  to explain the reasons 
for discrepancies. 
Finally,  some comparisons are possible  between  the  U.S.  international 
transactions  data and data collected  by the Federal Reserve Board on U.S. 
nonbanks’ borrowing from and deposits at banks outside the United States. A 
special survey covering the end of  1982, completed by the Federal  Reserve 354  Lois Stekler 
with the cooperation of  foreign governments, indicated  that the U.S.  inter- 
national transactions data understated dollar deposits abroad of U.S. nonbank 
residents by about $75 billion and claims of  banks abroad on U.S. nonbanks 
by about $25 billion.  A clarification by  the U.S. Treasury of reporting re- 
sponsibility in mid- 1986 led to a significant improvement in coverage of bank 
loans to U.S. nonbanks in the U.S. data, although the question of when these 
capital inflows occurred was left unanswered and some inflows still appear to 
be omitted. However, the large omission of deposits outside the United States 
has not been dealt with. The Federal Reserve now regularly collects data on 
such deposits  for inclusion  in M3, but  these  data  are not used  in the U.S. 
international transactions accounts because of unresolved problems of double- 
counting and the lack of geographic information. Comparison of Federal Re- 
serve data with the U.S.  international transactions data indicates that substantial 
capital  flows continue to be omitted. BIS data on banks’ liabilities  to U.S. 
nonbanks are roughly comparable to the Federal Reserve data. 
There are a substantial number of reasons to believe that inadequacies in the 
reporting of U.S. capital flows are likely to increase in coming years. Growing 
securitization  of  international  capital  flows has  shifted  transactions  off  the 
balance  sheets of  banks,  who  tend  to  be  relatively  accurate reporters.  In 
addition, the growing sophistication of U.S. corporations and individuals has 
increased  the  volume  of  transactions  directly  with  intermediaries  located 
outside the United  States (and beyond the reach  of U.S. reporting  require- 
ments). In either case, it is much easier to monitor reporting by a few large 
banks than to gather accurate information from thousands of corporations and 
wealthy investors. Moreover,  technological changes and innovations require 
constant monitoring  and efforts to clear up questions of reporting responsi- 
bilities that were not foreseen when report forms were designed. 
Inadequacies of  Data on Investment lncome 
If the data on U.S. capital flows are inadequate, then certain components 
of investment income will be inadequate as well. There are no direct reports 
of income on private portfolio claims and liabilities and only partial reports 
on U.S. government interest payments to foreigners. These income flows are 
estimated by the Department of Commerce from information on the level of 
assets and estimated rates of return. Estimates of  the level of  assets depend, 
in turn, on periodic benchmark surveys combined with subsequent recorded 
capital flows and rough valuation adjustments. Benchmark surveys of foreign 
portfolio investments in the United States are conducted regularly, but the last 
survey of  U.S. portfolio assets abroad dates from World War 11.  Errors  in 
valuation  adjustments  made since that date could  potentially  cumulate to a 
substantial  sum. In  addition, omission of  capital  flows from the  reporting 
system, such as the increase in U.S. nonbanks’ Eurodollar deposits discussed 
above,  would  lead  to the understatement  of  portfolio  investment  income. 
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abroad and liabilities to banks abroad, the IMF working party estimated that 
U.S. net investment income was underestimated by about $4 billion in 1983. 
Since  1983, Treasury International  Capital (TIC) reporting of  liabilities  to 
banks abroad has been improved, but reporting of  claims has not, so current 
U.S. net investment  income is probably  underestimated  by  several billions 
more. 
Errors will  also be  introduced  into the estimates of  portfolio investment 
income if the Commerce Departments’ estimates of rates of  return are inac- 
curate. The Commerce Department does periodically review the rates they use 
with major banks and other financial institutions in an attempt to keep up with 
the evolution of financial markets. However, there are inevitable problems; to 
illustrate, the role of the prime rate in bank lending has diminished dramatically 
in recent years, and the spread over LIBOR (London interbank offer rate) paid 
by particular countries may vary. In addition, the capital flows data frequently 
aggregate a mixture of  instruments that  pay  differing rates of  return;  little 
information is available on how they should be weighted. For example, data 
on debt securities with maturities of more than one year are aggregated. How- 
ever, the interest on thirty-year bonds can differ substantially from the rate on 
two-year notes that are due in thirty days. Moreover, fees on off-balance sheet 
transactions are becoming increasingly important to banks; efforts are currently 
underway to improve estimates of income associated with these transactions. 
In conclusion, despite the best efforts of  the Department of Commerce, there 
are, undoubtedly, inaccuracies in the rates of return they use to estimate  portfolio 
investment income. However, it is not clear that there would be any systematic 
bias in these errors, leading to a consistent over- or  underestimation of receipts 
or payments. 
In  contrast  to private  portfolio receipts  and payments, direct  investment 
receipts  and  payments  are directly  reported  by  businesses.  The reporting 
system is extensive, and missing reporters are likely to be small investors, so 
that only small amounts would be unaccounted for. However, the very low rate 
of return on assets reported by foreign direct investors in the United States does 
raise questions. Much foreign investment in the United States (as well as U.S. 
direct  investment  abroad)  is  in  the  form  of  wholly  owned  subsidiaries; 
companies try to minimize their tax burdens by using intercompany transac- 
tions  to  shift  profits  from high  to low tax jurisdictions. The IRS recently 
reached an agreement to collect substantial back taxes from Toyota and Nissan 
on the grounds that they understated their U.S. profits by overcharging their 
affiliates for imported cars. If they had declared the same inflated value for the 
cars when they were imported, this would just shift payments from services 
to merchandise trade and not contribute to the statistical discrepancy. However, 
apparently  it  was common  practice  to declare a  lower value for customs 
purposes than was used in calculating profits (contributing a negative value to 
the statistical  discrepancy); the  IRS has issued  a rule in  1987 ending this 
practice by foreign investors in the United States. U.S.  direct investors abroad 356  Lois Stekler 
have similar incentives to shift profits to lower tax jurisdictions, overstating 
direct  investment  receipts.  However,  this  would  have  little  impact  on  the 
statistical  discrepancy  unless  they  declared one price  for exports to  their 
affiliates in U.S. export documents and used another in calculating the profits 
of their affiliates. (The failure of multinational companies to adequately charge 
their  foreign  affiliates for R&D expenditures, central administration  costs, 
etc., would just shift receipts from services to direct investment, and not affect 
the net current account.) 
Inadequacy of  Data on Other Services and Uniluterul Transfers 
The growing importance of services in the U.S. economy has led to efforts 
over the last decade to improve the coverage of services in the U.  S.  international 
transactions accounts. However, many inadequacies remain. The Department 
of  Commerce has just conducted a special survey of  a wide variety of service 
transactions with foreigners that are currently not covered, including sales of 
information, computer and  data processing  services, legal  and  accounting 
services, etc. Depending on the results,  regular surveys may be instituted to 
cover the most important types of service transactions. In addition, the coverage 
of  medical services provided to foreigners was added in  1987, and estimates 
are now included for fees earned by brokers  and dealers on stock and bond 
transactions. Many gaps remain; the Commerce Department is currently work- 
ing on ways to estimate education expenditures of foreign students in the United 
States and U.S. students abroad. 
In addition to inadequacies in the coverage of many service transactions, the 
current estimates of immigrants transfers (which include only information on 
immigrants  from Canada) undoubtedly  underestimate  the total (Frankel and 
Long 1985). For a country like the United States, with a tradition of welcoming 
large numbers of immigrants, the omission of immigrants transfers from the 
international transactions  accounts could contribute significantly to the posi- 
tive statistical discrepancy  (see Frankel and Long  1985). 
Inadequacy of  Data on Trade 
It is generally assumed that the U.S. data on trade are reasonably accurate 
and that errors and omissions in these data could not explain wide swings in 
the statistical discrepancy from quarter to quarter. However, because imports 
are frequently subject to duties or quotas, they are likely to be more carefully 
tracked  than  exports. This point  is  illustrated  by  the results  of  the regular 
reconciliation  meetings  of  U.  S. and Canadian statisticians.  Comparison of 
Canadian with  U.S.  customs data has  led the Department of  Commerce to 
increase U.S. exports in the published accounts by between $6 and $10 billion 
(or between 2.5 and 4.7 percent of the compiled total) in the years  1985-87. 
However, the underreporting of exports to other countries is probably not as 
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depend on compliance with requirements that truckers place export documents 
in unmanned drop-boxes at large numbers of  border crossings. 
Another potential cause for concern is that fact that a significant part of U.S. 
trade is accounted for by transactions  between  multinational  firms and their 
affiliates. Transactions  between U.S. corporations and their majority-owned 
foreign affiliates accounted for approximately 25 percent of U.S.  merchandise 
exports and 15 percent  of U.S.  merchandise imports in  1986. Transactions 
between foreign companies and their U.S. affiliates accounted approximately 
for an additional  10 percent of U.S. exports and 25 percent of U.S. imports 
in 1986. No information is available on what part of this trade is with wholly 
owned affiliates, but in cases where transactions are between parts of the same 
firm,  prices  charged  affiliates  or  declared  for customs purposes  may  not 
accurately reflect market values.  Presumably,  the declared values of imports 
subject to customs duties are carefully monitored, but the values declared on 
other transactions  are probably not scrutinized as carefully, and may deviate 
substantially from market value. 
Conclusions on the Adequacy of  Reporting Systems 
In conclusion, detailed examination of the U .S. international transactions 
accounts reveals many components that are inadequately covered or where the 
data appear to be inaccurate. Efforts are underway to improve the data, but 
results in many cases would  require significant expenditures of  money  and 
increases  in  reporting  burdens.  Moreover,  many  improvements would  not 
necessarily reduce the large positive statistical discrepancies observed in recent 
years. 
9.2.2  Statistical Analysis 
In addition to examining the adequacy of  data on components of  the U.S. 
international transactions accounts, it is possible to explore the sources of the 
statistical discrepancy  in the accounts by examining correlations  with other 
data. 
In order to explore whether the  statistical discrepancy  behaves like unre- 
corded net capital inflows, I have looked at the correlation  with recorded net 
capital  inflows,  components  of  recorded  inflows,  and  variables  that  are 
conventionally used to explain capital flows such as interest rate differentials, 
expected exchange rate changes, and LDC capital flight. 
It should be recognized that the insights obtained from correlations between 
the statistical discrepancy and recorded net capital inflows or components of 
recorded inflows are limited. Lack of correlation between the statistical dis- 
crepancy and a particular component of the balance of payments accounts does 
not prove that there are not substantial errors and omissions in reporting of that 
component. The correlation would be high only if a stable  fraction of the balance 
of  payments component were  unreported.  Moreover, since the  balance  of 358  Lois Stekler 
payments  accounts are a double entry  system, any correlation  between  the 
statistical  discrepancy and a particular  component  of the accounts could be 
interpreted  in two ways: either reporting of that component is inadequate or 
reporting  of  the  other  side of  the  transaction  is inadequate. Sign does not 
necessarily  indicate which interpretation is correct; for example, a negative 
correlation of the statistical discrepancy with foreign purchases of  corporate 
securities could indicate either that sales of securities were being missed or that 
the reporting of the assets that investors were switching out of in order to pay 
for the securities was inadequate. In addition, the correlation results must be 
treated with caution because the estimates have been unstable; the addition or 
elimination of  a few observations can change the results. 
With these caveats in mind, table 9.3 shows the results of regression with 
various components of the international transactions accounts. All components 
were net to avoid spurious correlation because both the statistical discrepancy 
and almost everything else has gotten larger since 1970. Multiple regressions 
were not tried because the statistical discrepancy is, by definition, equal to the 
sum of  the other components in the U.S. international transactions accounts 
with  the  reverse  sign. The statistical  discrepancy  appears  to be  positively 
correlated with net direct investment inflows (row 6), but negatively related to 
other capital inflows (row 7), particularly bank reported inflows (row 8). One 
hypothesis  that  would  be  consistent  with  these  results  is that capital  flows 
involving banks are more accurately reported than other flows, and when flows 
shift to other channels,  errors and omissions rise. 
Table 9.3 also shows the results of  a regression relating the statistical dis- 
crepancy to variables that might be used to explain net capital flows (row 12): 
the differential between U.S. and weighted average foreign long-term interest 
rates and expected  exchange  rate  changes  (where it is assumed  that actual 
exchange rate changes were correctly expected). These variables do not explain 
much of the variation in the statistical discrepancy, but it does appear that the 
statistical  discrepancy rises when  U.S. interest rates rise relative to foreign 
interest rates. 
The next regression (row 13)  in table 9.3  relates the statistical discrepancy to 
one measure of capital flight from Latin America and the Philippines. Capital 
flight is crudely measured as equal to the gross external debt of these countries 
plus  the  inflow of  net  foreign direct  investment  minus  the  current  account 
deficit  minus  the  change  in  external  assets  of  the  central  bank  and  the 
commercial banks. The R2 in this equation is not comparable to those in the 
other regressions because the data are annual rather than quarterly. However, 
the correlation appears strong and the coefficient appears high, implying that 
about half of every dollar of  capital flight from these countries ended up in 
unrecorded  U.S. capital inflows. 
In conclusion,  although these regression  results  must be  viewed  only  as 
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Table 9.3  Statistical Discrepancy Regressions 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient  T-Stat.  R2 
A. Components of U.S. International Transactions (1970Q1- 198744) 
1. Trade balance 
2.  Services balance 
3.  Net investment income 
4.  Other service income 
5. Current account balance 
6. Net direct investment capital inflow 
7. Net other private capital inflows 
8.  Bank reported 
9.  Nonbank reported 
10. Net official capital inflow 
















-  2.02 
2.23 
-2.94 
-  2.66 
-0.36 
-1.13 












B. Variables Used to Explain Capital Flows (1974Ql- 198744) 
~ 
12. Constant  3.9  6.01 
Exchange rate change'  16.7  I .03 
U.S .-Foreign  interest differential"  1.1  2.66  .I0 
C. Capital Flight (1978-1987) 
13. Constant 
Capital flight' 
15.0  6.27  .71 
.57  3.30 
D. U.S. Interest Rate Level (1970Q1-1987Q4) 
14. Constant  -  1.4  -  .78  .I1 
U.S. Treasury bill rated  .6  2.63 
Nore: All regressions were OLS with Cochrane-Orcutt correction. Data were in billions of dollars. 
Annual data were used in the capital flight regressions, quarterly data in all others (not including 
the seasonal discrepancy adjustment). 
aherest rate on ten-year  U.S. Treasury  bonds  minus the trade-weighted  average of  rates  on 
ten-year government bonds for the G-  10 countries. 
'Change  in  the Federal Reserve  trade-weighted  index of  the value of  the dollar  against (3-10 
currencies, (I, -  I, - 1)/1,  .  I. 
'Capital  flight from ten Latin American countries and the Philippines. Equal to the gross external 
debt plus the inflow of net foreign direct investment minus the current account deficit, minus the 
change in external assets of  the central banks and the commercial banks. 
dU.S. Treasury bill rate: three-month,  secondary market. 
support the view that at least part of  the statistical discrepancy  in the  U.S. 
international transactions accounts is the result of  errors and omissions in the 
reporting of  capital flows. 
Table  9.3 also reports  the  results  of  regressions  relating  the  statistical 
discrepancy  to  components  of  the  current  account.  There appears  to  be  a 360  Lois Stekler 
negative relationship between the trade balance and the discrepancy  (row 1). 
One possible explanation is that a fraction of the capital inflow necessary to 
finance the trade deficit is unreported. There is a positive, but not statistically 
significant relationship  with the services balance (row 2).  This positive rela- 
tionship is supported by a regression relating the statistical discrepancy to the 
level  of  U.S. interest  rates  (row  14); if  interest  income were being  under- 
reported, the amounts involved would tend to increase as interest rates rose. 
9.2.3  Conclusions on the U.S. Statistical Discrepancy 
There are strong reasons to suspect errors and omissions in the reporting of 
both current and capital account transactions in the U.S. data. Inspection of 
the reporting systems and correlations between the statistical discrepancy and 
various  variables  confirm these  suspicions. However, it  is very  difficult  to 
quantify the contribution of current account versus capital account transactions 
to the statistical discrepancy. It would seem safe to assume, however, that the 
shift of  the U .  S. current account from near balance in the first three years of 
the 1980s to deficits of around $150 billion in recent years cannot be accounted 
for by errors and omissions; the direction of change is clear, although the exact 
magnitude of  the deficit could be significantly below $150 billion. 
9.3  International Investment Position Data: Global 
Net debtor positions  as well as current accounts are frequently mentioned 
as indicators of sustainability and the need for policy adjustments. Unlike the 
current account data, which are readily available for a large number of countries 
on  a consistent  basis  from IMF sources, data on  international  investment 
positions must be collected from national sources. The difficulties of measuring 
a country’s net investment position will become apparent in the next section 
of the paper, where the U.S. net investment  position  is examined in detail. 
Moreover, since there are no commonly agreed upon guidelines on how assets 
and liabilities should be valued, it is unlikely, even if data were available from 
all countries, that the sum of all countries’ positions would equal zero. 
With  this caveat in mind, table 9.4 shows net external  assets (excluding 
gold) for the seven major industrial countries and IMF projections  for 1987 
through  1989 (IMF 1988, 89). Over the next few years, these countries as a 
group are expected to move into a large negative position.  According to the 
IMF (1988, 90): 
Given that the recorded debt stock of the capital importing countries, which 
amounted to $1200 billion at the end of  1987, is unlikely to be fully matched 
by the assets of the smaller industrial countries and the capital exporting 
countries in the Middle East, the data presented here would seem to confirm 
the existence of a very large amount of cross-border assets recognized  by 
debtor countries but which do not seem to be reflected  in the statistics of 
creditor countries Table 9.4  Major Industrial Countries: Net External Assets, Excluding Gold, 1980- 1989 (end of period, in billions of  dollars) 
I980  1981  I982  1983  I984  1985  1986  1987"  1988"  1989" 
Canada 
United  States 
Japan 
France 




-88.4  -111.5 
95.1  129.9 
10.5  9.9 
26.1  20.1 
-  1.1  -  14.7 
27.2  47.6 
69.4  81.3 
-  - 












-  18.1 
69.2 
60.1 
-  20.7 
-  114.3 
-7.5 
73.5 
-  22.2 
34.1 
-  18.2 
84.5 
29.9 
-  122.1 
-  123.0 
128.9 
58.6 
-  32.1 
105.4 
4.3 
-  11.4 
-  142.1 






-  1.9 
-  149.3 
-435.4 
266.0 
-  3.4 
150.5 
-  34.0 
159.5 
-46.1 
-  160.0 
-  576.5 
343.8 











-  133.7 
-  9.6 
~~ 
Source: IMF (1988, 89). 
"IMF staff estimates and projections, excluding valuation effects and based on World Economic Outlook baseline assumptions of constant real exchange rates and interest 
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This theme is examined in more detail in the Report on the World Current 
Account Discrepuncy (IMF 1987). The IMF working party concluded that the 
underreporting  of  assets  was  widespread  across  countries;  in  particular, 
estimates of the international claims and liabilities of  nonbanks appear to be 
deficient.  Some idea of  magnitudes can  be  inferred  from the other side of 
transactions: bank records of claims on and liabilities to nonbank foreigners. 
The reasons for the inadequacy of data on nonbanks assets and liabilities vary 
but include evasion of  taxes and exchange controls and ignorance of reporting 
requirements. This  problem  has  been  exacerbated  in  recent  years  by  the 
securitization of international lending; information on issuers of securities in 
international  bond  markets  is  readily  available,  but  little  information  is 
available on the purchasers  of these securities. 
In conclusion, it appears that there is significant underreporting of claims 
in many countries’ net investment position data. However, forecasts of current 
accounts are likely to provide a reasonable indication of directions of change 
and,  in  many  cases,  of  future  trends  in  investment  income  payments. 
Moreover,  in  the  case of  highly  indebted  countries that  have  experienced 
significant capital flight, the fact that some residents of the country have assets 
hidden abroad and are earning income on these assets may be of  little use if 
these assets are beyond government control. 
9.4  U.S. Net International Investment Position 
According to the Department of Commerce, foreign assets in the United 
States exceeded U.S. assets abroad by approximately  $368 billion at the end 
of  1987 (see table 9.5). This net debtor position is a recent development; from 
World War I through  1984, the United States was a net creditor to the rest of 
the world, with the net asset position reaching a peak of $141 billion in 1981. 
The sharp reversal  in recent years is a result of the large net capital inflows 
associated  with  growing  U.S. current  account deficits.  Valuation  changes 
estimated  by  the  Department  of  Commerce play  some role  in  explaining 
changes in position from year to year,  but,  in recent  years, these valuation 
changes have been  small relative to recorded capital flows. 
As acknowledged by the Department of Commerce, these data are a rough 
indicator  and  not  a precise  statistical  measure  of  U.S.  net  indebtedness  to 
foreigners because of  errors and omissions in the U.S. international transac- 
tions data and because of  valuation problems. 
9.4.1  Errors and Omissions 
As discussed  earlier,  the  statistical  discrepancy  in the U.S. international 
transactions  accounts has been  large and positive  for the past decade, indi- 
cating some combination  of  omitted net exports of  goods and services and 
omitted net capital inflows.  In fact, cumulative net unrecorded  transactions 363  International Transactions & Position Data in Policy Coordination 
Table 9.5  International Investment Position of the United States at Year End 
(in billions of dollars) 
Row  Type of Investment  1975  1980  1985  1986  1987 
I  Net  international investment position 
of the United States 
2  U.S. assets abroad 
3  Official reserve assets 
4 
5  Private assets 
6  Direct investment abroad 
7  Foreign securities 
8  Bonds 
9  Corporate stocks 
Government assets, other than official 
10  Claims on unaffiliated foreigners 
I  I 
12  Foreign assets in the United States 
13  Official assets in the U.S. 
14  Other assets in the United States 
15 
16  U.S. Treasury securities 
17 
18  Corporate and other bonds 
19  Corporate stocks 
20 
21 
reported by  U.S. nonbanking concerns 
Claims reported by  U.S. banks 
Direct investment in the  United States 
U.S. securities other than U.S. Treasury 
securities 
U.S. liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners 
U.S.  liabilities reported by  U.S. banks, 
reported by  U.S. nonbanking concerns 
not included elsewhere 
































































-269  -368 
1,071  1,168 
49  46 
90  88 
933  1,034 
260  309 
133  147 
82  91 
51  56 
33  30 
507  548 
1,341  1,536 
242  283 
1,099  1,253 
220  262 
91  78 
309  344 
142  171 
I67  173 
27  29 
452  539 
between  1959 and  1987 amounted to over $190 billion.  Since the published 
net investment data rely only on recorded capital flows, the real net investment 
position could be more negative. 
On the other hand, alternative sources of data indicate that U.S. nonbanks’ 
deposits at banks outside the United States are seriously underestimated in the 
position data. As of the end of  1987, Federal Reserve data indicate that these 
deposits are at least $70 billion larger than the amount included in the position 
data. 
9.4.2  Valuation Problems 
Apart from  stocks and  bonds,  the Department  of  Commerce does not 
attempt to revalue assets according to market prices. And even in the case of 
stocks and bonds, the valuation methods may be subject to substantial errors. 364  Lois Stekler 
Securities 
The Treasury Department conducts periodic benchmark surveys of the value 
of foreign holdings of U.S. stocks and bonds (rows 16  through 19  in table 9.5). 
In between these surveys, reliance must be placed on data collected on new 
transactions and estimates of the change in value of previous holdings (based 
on movements in stock market price indices and interest rate movements). In 
estimating the investment position, BEA is currently using data from the 1978 
benchmark  survey; however,  1984 data will be available soon. Estimates of 
changes in value are necessarily crude since foreigners’ holdings of stocks may 
differ in composition from the stocks included in various market averages and 
since little information is available on the term structure of foreigners’ holdings 
of  bonds. 
For U.S. holdings of  foreign stocks and bonds  (rows 8 and 9), the latest 
benchmark  survey was conducted during World War 11; no survey has been 
conducted  since then because of  the  tremendous  difficulty  and  expense of 
obtaining accurate data. As a result, the current estimate of holdings is based 
upon data on transactions since World War I1 and valuation adjustments based 
on foreign stock market  indices, and interest  rate and exchange rate move- 
ments. The task of valuing U.S. holdings of  foreign securities is made even 
more difficult by the fact that purchases and sales data are collected on the basis 
of  the nationality  of  the transactor,  and not  the issuer; transactions  through 
financial centers like  London  need  not  reflect  purchases  or sales  of  U.K. 
securities. As a result, it certainly is possible that the errors in the estimated 
valuation  adjustments  to  U.S.  holdings  of  foreign  securities  could  have 
cumulated to a substantial sum since World War 11. 
Gold 
U.S. official reserve holdings of gold (included in row 3) are valued at the 
official price  ($42.22 per ounce), while the market price is about  10 times 
higher. U.S. assets would be about $100 billion larger if gold were valued at 
current market prices. 
Direct Investment 
In addition, direct investment claims (row 6) and liabilities (row 15) are at 
book value. It seems likely that this valuation understates the market value of 
U.S. direct investment abroad by more than it understates the value of  foreign 
direct investment in the United States because foreign direct investment in the 
United States is, on average, more recent than U.S. direct investment abroad. 
One way  of  crudely estimating market  value  would  be  to  assume that  the 
market value of investments  (measured  in dollars)  increases proportionately 
with inflation and exchange rate changes (Helkie and Stekler 1987). Starting 
with the book value of direct investment assets in 1964, inflating each year by 
a weighted average foreign price index adjusted for exchange rate changes and 365  International Transactions & Position Data in Policy Coordination 
then adding the new capital outflow yields an estimate of the value of U.S. 
direct investment assets of about $700 billion at the end of  1987. Using the 
same methodology,  estimated foreign direct  investment in the United States 
would be $350 billion, and the net position would be $350 billion, $300 billion 
larger than the net included by the Department of Commerce. 
Comparison of the size of direct investment receipts and payments suggests 
that the market value of  U.S. assets abroad may exceed the market value of 
foreign assets here by even more. The ratio of reported receipts to payments 
in recent years has been about 3 to 1, in contrast to the 2 to 1 ratio estimated 
above. However,  this  ratio  calculated  using  receipts  and payments  may  be 
distorted by temporary factors which inflate or depress earnings; if generally 
perceived as temporary, they would have a limited effect on the market value 
of assets. In addition, many affiliates of foreign companies in the United States 
and foreign affiliates of  U.S. companies are wholly owned subsidiaries; the 
parent  companies  enjoy  considerable latitude  in  determining charges  for 
transactions  with  their  subsidiaries,  and  tax  considerations  may  play  a 
significant role in determining where profits are reported. 
Bank Claims and Liabilities 
Bank-reported  claims on and liabilities to foreigners  (rows 11 and 21 in 
table 9.5) are also at book value. No adjustment is made, for example, for the 
market value of loans to countries experiencing debt servicing problems (as 
long as the banks continue to carry the loans on their books at full value). 
9.4.3  Conclusions 
The net international investment position of the United States, as published 
by  the Department of Commerce, is subject to a substantial margin of error 
because  of  the errors and  omissions in  the  U.S. international  transactions 
accounts and because of  valuation problems.  However, given the magnitude 
of recent U.S. current account deficits, there is little doubt that the published 
data correctly indicate the direction and rough magnitude of change. 
9.5  Usefulness of Current Account and Position Data as Indicators 
of Disequilibrium 
Even if data were completely accurate, a given current account and invest- 
ment position may not clearly indicate the need for policy changes because of 
lags in the adjustment process or underlying  long-run trends. 
9.5.1  Lags 
The problem with using observed current account positions as an indicator 
of disequilibrium  requiring  policy  adjustments  can be illustrated by consid- 
ering the current  U.S.  situation. Estimates of  whether  substantial  further 
depreciation  of  the dollar is  necessary  to correct the  U.S.  current  account 366  Lois Stekler 
deficit  depend  crucially  on  whether  all  or  only  part  of  the  impact  of  the 
depreciation of the dollar from its high of  February  1985 has been realized. 
Given  current  techniques  for  estimating  the  length  and  shape of  lagged 
adjustments,  it  is  possible  for different  econometricians  to  arrive  at  very 
different conclusions using the same data. This problem has been discussed 
extensively elsewhere, for example, at the January 1987 Brookings workshop 
on the  U.S. external  deficit,  and  I do not  intend  to repeat  it  (see Bryant, 
Holtham,  and Hooper  1988, 101-39). 
9.5.2  Underlying Long-Run Trends 
Another problem with using current account or investment position data as 
an indicator of required policy adjustments  is the need to take into account 
underlying trends.  For example, it  may be appropriate for a country with a 
rapidly  aging  population  to run  current  account  surpluses  and  accumulate 
assets in preparation for future years when a large retired population must be 
supported. There are many additional factors which might mean that it would 
be unwise to identify current account balance  with equilibrium and current 
account surpluses or deficits with disequilibrium. I plan to focus on only one 
of these: the implications for future U.S. net investment income of the growing 
U.S. net international indebtedness. 
Many  observers  have  concluded  that  the  United  States  will  have to  run 
substantial trade surpluses in the future to cover large net payments of invest- 
ment income on the U.S. net debtor position.  Crude estimates are arrived at 
by assuming that the U. S . net debt will accumulate to $1 trillion and by assuming 
an interest rate, for example, 7 percent, producing an estimate of around $70 
billion per year in net interest payments.  These back-of-the-envelope  calcu- 
lations probably substantially overstate the net interest payments that are likely 
to be associated with a recorded U.S. net investment position of that size. 
The reasons for this  are twofold:  first,  the rate of return  on U.S. assets 
abroad tends to be higher than the rate of return on foreign assets in the United 
States, and, second, while U.S. liabilities are growing more rapidly than U.S. 
assets, both are likely to continue to trend upwards. The combined effect of 
these factors is illustrated by the fact that net investment income was positive 
in  1987 despite a sizable net debtor position.  U.S.  net  investment  income 
would tend to increase if our net debtor position were not growing. 
Relative Rates of  Return 
Two questions are apparent: is this differential in rates of return likely to 
persist in the future and does it represent a real difference or just a recorded 
difference in rates of return? Turning first to direct investment, table 9.6 shows 
the rate  of return  on direct  investment  as published  by  the  Department  of 
Commerce. Because the direct investment position used in these calculations 
is measured at book value, and since direct investment in the United States is, 
on average, more recent than U.S. direct investment abroad, the value of U.S. 367  International Transactions & Position Data  in Policy  Coordination 
Table 9.6  Implicit Rates of Return on U.S. Direct Investments 
Claims  Liabilities 
Dept. of  Dept. of 









































direct  investment  abroad  is more  seriously  understated  because  of  inflation 
than the value of foreign direct investment in the United States. If the rates of 
return  are recalculated  using  Department of  Commerce capital  flows data, 
adjusted for inflation and exchange rate changes (also shown in the table), the 
differences are reduced substantially, but some margin remains. 
Some differential might be expected on the grounds that some U.S. direct 
investment abroad is located in countries where political and economic risks 
are significant. However, a major part of the differential is probably the result 
of tax incentives which lead multinational firms to use transfer prices to shift 
reported profits to lower tax jurisdictions abroad. Although U.S. corporate tax 
rates  were  lowered  recently  relative  to other industrial  countries, they  still 
remain above rates in various tax havens. The incentive to report profits abroad 
will  probably  persist,  inflating  reported receipts  on U.S.  direct  investment 
abroad and depressing  payments on foreign direct investment  in the United 
States.  Balancing  this  distortion of  the  direct  investment  accounts is  the 
underreporting of exports of goods and services by U.S. corporations to their 
affiliates abroad and the overstatement of the imports of goods and services by 
the U.S. affiliates of foreign companies. These understatements of net credits 
on other current account items are likely to grow as direct investment in and 
out of the United States continues to expand, so errors in the returns on direct 
investment  are likely to be  matched  by  equal and opposite errors in other 
current account items. 
Turning now to portfolio investment income, table 9.7 shows the average 
rates of return implicit in the data published by the Department of Commerce 
on income and  position.  The implicit  rate for private  payments has  been 
consistently below the rate for government payments and private receipts. There 
are several explanations for this. First, at the end of 1987, foreign holdings of 
U.S. equities amounted to $173 billion, somewhat less than 20 percent of the 
U.S. private sector’s portfolio liabilities to foreigners, while U.S.  holdings of 
foreign equities  amounted to only $56 billion, less than  10 percent of  U.S. 368  Lois Stekler 
Table 9.7  Implicit Rates of Return on U.S. Portfolio Investments 
Claims  Liabilities 









































private portfolio claims on foreigners. Since dividends generally provide only 
a part of the expected return on equities, and since capital gains on stocks are 
excluded from the balance of payments accounts, the average rate of return on 
both portfolio claims and liabilities is brought down, but the impact is larger 
on the payments  side. 
Second, the bulk  of U.S. portfolio claims and liabilities  are reported  by 
banks: about three-quarters of private claims and three-fifths of  private lia- 
bilities. As intermediaries, banks make profits by earning more on their assets 
than they pay on their liabilities.2 In addition, the Department of Commerce 
includes in receipts of income on U.S. assets abroad estimates of fees earned 
by banks in the United States for various services provided to foreigners.  In 
response  to pressures  to improve capital adequacy,  major U.S. banks  have 
slowed the growth of their balance sheets and have focused increased attention 
on profitable off-balance-sheet transactions. Fees from these off-balance-sheet 
services to foreigners are likely to continue to grow in the future. 
Finally, U.S. nonbanks are likely to be paid a higher rate of return on their 
dollar deposits abroad than foreigners  are paid on their bank deposits in the 
United  States  because  of  the  absence of  reserve  requirements  and  deposit 
insurance charges in the Eurodollar market. 
Growth of  Gross Claims and Liabilities 
Despite the shift to a net debtor position, U.S.  assets abroad have continued 
to grow, illustrating the continuing internationalization of financial markets and 
the use of U.S. financial institutions as intermediaries  by foreigners. As can 
be seen in figure 9.2, the rate of growth of  U.S.  portfolio claims on foreigners 
has  slowed  in recent  years, as the U.S. current  account deficit has grown. 
However, the deceleration is exaggerated by the rapid growth of bank claims 
in 1981 and 1982;  in these years banks shifted business from the books of their 
affiliates outside the United  States to their  newly  established  International 
Banking Facilities (IBFs). The slower growth of  bank claims in recent years 
also has been associated  with the debt crisis and efforts to improve capital 
adequacy as well as a slowdown in inflation. As a result, one might expect the 369  International Transactions & Position Data in Policy Coordination 
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Fig. 9.2  U.S. international investment position 
rate of growth of U.  S.  private portfolio claims on foreigners  to remain somewhat 
below the average for the 1970s and early 1980s, but to remain significant. 
U.S. direct investment assets abroad have also continued to grow in recent 
years,  although the  year  to  year  changes  are  sensitive  to  fluctuations  in 
economic activity  (and  currency translation  effects). U.S.-based  firms are 
likely to continue to invest in growing economies abroad and the pressures of 
international  competition  are  likely  to  continue  the  trend  toward  global 
sourcing and expansion of production facilities in countries with lower costs. 370  Lois Stekler 
Implications for U.S. Net Investment Income 
The simulations done with the Multicountry Model of the Federal Reserve Board 
for the Brookings Conference on  the U .S.  Current Account (January 1987)  illustrate 
the implications of continuing growth of U.  S,  gross claims on foreigners for future 
net investment income. Between 1986 and 1991, the U.S. net investment position 
declines by $746 billion, from -  $280 billion to -  $1026 billion. However, U.S. 
net investment income declines only by $23 billion, from $22 billion to -  $ I  billion. 
These numbers are just illustrative; they should not be interpreted as a forecast 
because the underlying assumptions are somewhat arbitrary and have, in many 
cases, been overtaken by more recent developments. But they do illustrate the point 
that underlying trends must be taken into account, along with current account 
positions, in analyzing necessary policy adjustments. 
9.6  Conclusions 
The data on U.S. and other countries’ current accounts and international 
investment positions  appear to be subject to a considerable  margin of  error. 
However, large shifts in recorded data are unlikely to be illusory. There is little 
doubt that the United States has been running massive current account deficits 
in recent years and that the rest of the world has accumulated large claims on 
the United States as a result. While the data may be accurate enough to discern 
broad trends, current account and net investment positions do not always yield 
unambiguous signals of the need for policy adjustments. This is illustrated by 
the current debate over the appropriate exchange rates for the U.S. dollar. 
Notes 
I. The published U.S.  data aggregate official and private purchases 0fU.S.  Treasury 
or other securities by Japan, while the Japanese data exclude central bank purchases of 
securities and do not distinguish between U.S. Treasuries and other long-term bonds. 
2. The IMF working party on the statistical  discrepancy in  world current account 
balances used a spread of 250 basis points between the rate earned on bank claims on 
nonbanks  and  the  rate  paid  on  liabilities  to  nonbanks;  the  spread  on  interbank 
transactions is much smaller. 
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